/ Latvia and the Gulf Region: Choosing between Interests, Opportunities, and Principles?

In 2018, the Middle East continued to experience immense changes. The demographic and economic situation, and the development of conflicts in the countries of the Gulf region, create new questions on the extent to which governments are connected to their citizens, to one another, and to the rest of the world. While in a wider context the North African states are facing demands for reforms while trying to solve regional and internal security challenges, lengthy conflicts in the Gulf region keep adding to the instability and fragmentation of the region. In the majority of countries in the region, there is an enormous gap between policy-makers, society, and the legitimacy of state institutions. The high level of unemployment, especially among the youth, as well as security threats, ideological diversity, and a number of other factors make it plausible to think that there is still a high potential for new unrest. In the context of previous years, especially in relation to various regional shocks, the Gulf region has been discussed throughout the world both in positive and negative circumstances. On the one hand, information on human rights violations and war crimes in Yemen and the issue of the Qatar blockade, as well as the regional ambitions expressed by Saudi Arabia and Iran, have reached the ears of the international society. On the other hand, the region is attempting to adjust to the global market system via sustainable and diversified economic strategies.

Latvia’s political approach towards developing a relationship with the Gulf region can be assessed from different perspectives as well. On the one hand, since 2017 (including during 2018), an active strengthening of relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and targeted efforts to approach other countries of the region, including Saudi Arabia and potentially Kuwait, have been taking place. On the other hand, recent attempts at strengthening relations with Iran seem to lose position against the backdrop of geopolitical developments. This paper, first of all, focuses on an assessment of Latvia’s bilateral relations, with an emphasis on economic relations and the potential for cooperation. Secondly, Latvia’s major challenges in engaging in bilateral relations with the countries of the Gulf region are analysed, taking into account the turbulence of the past year. The potential direction of the relationship in 2019 is also analysed. Thirdly, the paper examines the future potential for Latvia as a part of the European Union (EU) in areas such as energy, transport, and logistics.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LATVIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF REGION
The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively supports business cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, the countries of the Persian Gulf, Africa, and South East Asia. According to Latvia’s 2016-2020 development guidelines, the priority regions for cooperation include countries within the Eastern Partnership and Central Asia.1 Meanwhile, sufficiently intensive work is being conducted to strengthen relations with the countries of the Gulf region as well.

Boosting economic ties with the countries of the Gulf region should become a priority for Latvia’s external economic policy. The Gulf countries, primarily the UAE, can act as a strong channel for establishing links with the Middle East—a region important for business development.

Bilateral cooperation between Latvia and the UAE is currently being promoted by the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the UAE, the Latvian Investment and Development Agency Representative Office in the United Arab Emirates, and, of course, the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Latvia. Also, high-level political visits are an indispensable signal for the promotion of economic cooperation within the business environment of both countries. As in the previous year, the development of the business sector has been faster than at the governmental level. This development could be explained by the enthusiasm of entrepreneurs to seek opportunities in a number of countries in the Middle East, regardless of the views of policy-makers.2 Although currently the UAE is the most important trade partner in the region for Latvia, with Latvian food producers demonstrating the most visible success, many opportunities still remain untapped.

Latvia’s relations with the UAE have experienced rapid development. Several bilateral agreements have been signed, and Latvia’s exports have significantly increased. In comparison to previous years, 2018 has been quite revitalising in the context of Latvia’s relations with the UAE. In May 2018, a UAE business delegation led by the chairman of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry Majid Saif Al Ghurair visited Latvia. Also in May, Latvia welcomed a visit from the UAE minister of economy. Opportunities for cooperation in the field of transport and logistics have been identified from the UAE side and by Latvia’s transport and logistics companies alike. There is no doubt that the UAE has already become Latvia’s most significant trade partner of the Gulf countries; however, the potential of the Gulf region is much larger.

For the purpose of strengthening relations, in June 2018, Astra Kurme (the first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Latvia to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) was accredited to become a permanent representative to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The Embassy of Latvia to the UAE launched visa-issuing services in February 2018. The Embassy accepts visa applications from permanent residents of the United Arab Emirates, as well as from other countries of the Persian Gulf—including Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar.4

Also, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Latvian Investment and Development Agency organises regular discussions on business opportunities in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East region. Over the past year, over 60 Latvian entrepreneurs involved in food production, timber processing, pharmaceuticals, transport, logistics, and other sectors of the national economy have taken part in such discussions. Latvia’s participation in the “EXPO 2020” in Dubai will allow it to further strengthen bilateral economic relations between Latvia and the UAE. The launch of direct airBaltic flights from Abu Dhabi can also be seen as an important step, as it promotes tourism and people-to-people contacts, thus contributing to the economic dialogue between the two countries.

After the development of a successful dynamic in relations with UAE on the political level, the next steps for Latvia involve strengthening its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which is one of the UAE’s strongest allies in the region as well as a leading regional power. In March 2018, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Latvia Astra Kurme presented a letter of credence to the King and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. The ambassador affirmed her readiness to strengthen political dialogue by promoting the exchange of contacts between entrepreneurs and strengthening cooperation ties in areas such as food production, agriculture, forestry, wood processing, and IT.

Latvia’s attempts to strengthen its ties with the regional powers are commendable, and the development of good relations with the UAE is an important precondition for the successful development of relations with Saudi Arabia and its allies within the region and in the wider context of the Middle East. Nonetheless, recent controversial occurrences should also not be forgotten.

The Annual report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and planned action with respect to national foreign policy and the European Union clearly states that since the restoration of independence Latvia has strongly promoted the adherence to international law and human rights. The protection of these principles and fundamental values was necessary for the restoration of Latvia’s de facto independence, for the implementation of its transition towards a democratic society and the rule of law, as well as for the establishment of Latvia’s international image. Today, the international reputation of a country is a clear indication of the country’s value system, which either promotes or hinders the international interests of the state. In international organisations, Latvia’s prioritises promoting respect towards international law and punishment for the most serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.5

In this context, it is hard to fully understand Latvia’s argumentation and the categorical position it takes regarding not rushing into the potential development of relations with Iran, while at the same time promoting the strengthening of relations with Saudi Arabia.

Very recently, at the beginning of June 2017, four Arab countries—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt—imposed a total land, sea, and air blockade on Qatar in response to its “independent” external policy. Within 24 hours, all international flights were indefinitely suspended and the argument turned into a crisis, gravely affecting the lives of people in the aforementioned countries. The involved states have already been reprimanded by the UN regarding human rights violations against the population of Qatar. Also, Saudi Arabia recently decided to expel the Canadian ambassador, to withdraw thousands of students studying in Canada, and to threaten Ottawa with trade restrictions as a reaction to Canada’s call for the release of human rights activists detained in Saudi Arabia. These events clearly demonstrate that Saudi Arabia is making itself visible and is demonstrating its might. That is to say, if one wishes to maintain healthy economic relations with Saudi Arabia, the issue of human rights should be left in the hands of the kingdom itself.

Also, the issue of the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the role Saudi Arabia played in it remains unsolved. So do the activities of the Saudi Arabia-UAE coalition in Yemen. Since the military invasion of Yemen by the kingdom and its allies almost four years ago, the coalition led by Saudi Arabia has potentially broken a number of the rules of war and has been accused of war crimes by the UN.6 The majority of the countries of the UN Security Council are involved in the actions of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in one way or another. The involved countries are protecting Saudi Arabia and its allies from any international criticism regarding various issues. Countries such as the US, France, and the United Kingdom are leading cooperation partners in the coalition, with considerable investment in trade, including the supply of military equipment.

It is clear that Saudi Arabia holds a key set of cards that enables it to shield itself from international criticism over its operations in Yemen and events elsewhere in the world. However, the most important card is its over 70-year-long alliance with the US, which is being strengthened during the Trump administration as well.

Has the close bond between Saudi Arabia and the US and its EU allies made Latvia forget its own founding principles? “Since the restoration of independence, Latvia has been advocating compliance with international law and human rights. The protection of these principles and fundamental values was needed when restoring Latvia’s de factoindependence, in the transition to a democratic society governed by the rule of law, and in building Latvia’s image internationally. Today, the international reputation of a country reflects its national system of values, which should promote and not thwart the country’s international interests. […] Latvia’s priorities in international organisations are [… that it] welcomes the persecution of the most serious crimes—crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.”7 Given that business and economic relations require making concessions to one’s allies and backing down on one’s own principles, is lashing out against Iran proper and consistent with Latvia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Gulf countries?

Although it is beyond any doubt that Latvia’s choice to foster relations with the UAE, thus covering the wider market of the Gulf region, was the right step, still, as a result of the current geopolitical situation, a diversity of opinions can be found regarding Iran. The leading railway infrastructure company in Latvia, “Latvijas Dzelzceļš”, has launched active cooperation talks with the transport and logistics sector of Iran. In December 2017, a cooperation memorandum was signed between a subsidiary of “Latvijas Dzelzceļš”—“LDz loģistika”—and the Iranian logistics company “Railway Transportation Co” regarding joint efforts in establishing new routes from India and Iran, a plan that successfully coincides with Latvia’s interests in the context of the New Silk Road.8

Latvia’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Turkey Pēteris Kārlis Elferts presented a letter of credence to the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan Rouhani. The ambassador and the president discussed opportunities for widening cooperation between the two states, including the appointment of Latvia’s honorary consul to Iran. The Iranian side expressed interest in strengthening trade relations and signing a cooperation agreement between the chambers of industry and commerce of both countries, as well as in developing cooperation in the field of education and science.9,10 This gesture should be viewed positively, especially in such ambivalent times.

As it is known, regardless of the US’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Latvia (along with the EU) continues to advocate its necessity, as it views JCPOA to be the most efficient means of limiting the Iranian missile programme and strengthening global efforts on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, Latvia states that a close Euroatlantic bond and a dialogue should be maintained, because the solution for the normalisation of relations can only be reached with the participation of the US. Latvia believes that it is essential to work on finding a solution acceptable for both the EU and the US. However, the position taken by the US president that those who trade with Iran will not be trading with the US has had an effect on Latvia’s policy-makers. Although the EU, along with the remaining members of the Iran nuclear deal—Great Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia—remains committed in its support for Iran regarding civil nuclear power, and in the protection of their economic subjects as they conduct legitimate business with Iran,11 Latvia’s practical position is still not entirely clear.

LATVIA’S UNTAPPED OPPORTUNITY—IRAN
On arrival in Iran, the first thing that is noticeable is the Calvin Klein store and the recurrence of Coca Cola—the Western presence is there. Still, it appears that on a political level Latvia is not ready to support business with Iran. Some political visits and separate business visits that demonstrate Latvia’s willingness to cooperate “on paper” are being conducted, but on a concrete policy level the development of business contacts has been sluggish. The potential of Iran is tremendous: it is a country of 81 million people and it holds deep opportunities in many fields. The GDP of Iran surpassed 400 billion US dollars in 2017, putting it in 26th-27th place in the world—ahead of most countries of the Gulf region, including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as Egypt and Israel.12

Regardless of sanctions and various difficulties surrounding oil and gas sales, as well as trade challenges caused by the disconnection of SWIFT, Iran consistently remains in the lead within the region. There is a significant demand for outbound tourism in Iran, and Europe is an important destination. Business contacts demonstrate that interest in the Baltic States has increased. Subsequently, establishing direct flights and solving consular issues could serve as examples of successful cooperation in the development of this sector. The issue of aviation infrastructure is topical both in terms of strengthening bilateral relations and for business promotion—from the perspective of the Gulf region, Riga is in a strategically advantageous position for organising air-traffic with the Scandinavian countries.13 On the other hand, the issue of mutual trade promotion is important as well. On the political level, it is important for Latvia to be aware of its product(s) and trade potential in Iran. “Iran is a huge country, no matter how hard Latvia would wish to, it still would not be able to produce enough to cover just the Tehran market.”14

After visiting Iran, it is often stated that the country’s image in the media does not coincide with the reality—things look different on the ground. It is understandable that due to the complicated geopolitical setting there are many challenges for cooperation with Iran on the business and state levels alike; however, these challenges should not preclude taking a medium-term development perspective. Iran is an international player, in relation to which geopolitical interests are being carried out by Russia and China, as well as by the US and Europe.15

FUTURE POTENTIAL: ENERGY, TRANSPORT, AND LOGISTICS
At a time when political instability and unpredictability is increasing in regions that have traditionally been strategic energy resource suppliers to the global energy market, including the Middle East and North Africa, the future European Energy Union needs to both ensure the modernisation of the EU economy and improve the energy security of its member states.16

Latvia’s energy policy and the security thereof, as well as its competitiveness and sustainability, are closely related to the energy policy of the European Union. Traditionally, the EU’s primary and most important partners have been countries in the Middle East or the Gulf region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, etc. Although other partners also have a role in strengthening the energy policy, the input of the Gulf region countries is especially crucial, keeping in mind that the countries of this region produce 50% of all the world’s energy resources. The 2017 Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs states that “It is in the interests of Latvia’s energy security that in 2018 an agreement be achieved, which will ensure synchronisation of the Baltic States power grids with those of Central Europe, taking into account the safety of the system and its long-term impact on overall costs and tariffs”.17 A political roadmap on the synchronisation of the Baltic States’ power grids with those of Central Europe was signed on 28 June 2018. The signed roadmap makes it possible to take real action, and the first item on the agenda is “launching the procedure for the European Network of Transmission System Operators for electricity (ENTSO-E), which is the first technical step to including the Baltic States into the continental European network”.18 In this context, Latvia’s interests and the goal of attracting new members to the energy market, which would “bring opportunities to enhance Latvian and regional energy infrastructure and regulation by achieving closer integration with the European energy market”, was no less important. Latvia has been trying to achieve this by pursuing cooperation in line with the Ministry of Economy’s project “Guidelines for development of the energy sector 2016–2020”,19 which outlines and ensures the development of an energy policy with the country’s main partner—the EU—and which further develops mutual partnerships with the Gulf countries, thereby serving as a link for Latvia-EU and Gulf region cooperation.

For Latvia, establishing cooperation with the Gulf region is essential, keeping in mind the tension in relations with Russia and the desire of Latvia and other countries to become more independent from Russian energy resources and find new partners for energy cooperation instead. In the future, the Gulf region could potentially play this role through the mechanisms established by the EU.

In parallel with the indirect connectivity of the energy sector, the logistics sector also holds large potential for development. The logistics sector has been highly recognised in the Gulf region in recent years. As the regional logistics market proved itself to be a fundamental pillar of the regional economy, it has become central to the development plans of a number of countries. In 2015, logistics accounted for 13% of the GDP of Saudi Arabia and 10% of the GDP of the UAE, and it is expected that these numbers will continue to grow in the coming years due to economic diversification plans. The growing capacity of the region has already brought it international recognition. According to the latest World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI), the UAE ranks 11th out of 160 countries, surpassing the indicators of Canada, France, Australia, Hong Kong, and the US. On the regional level, the UAE ranks first. The LPI index divides countries into six trade areas, including the efficiency of customs, the quality of trade and transport infrastructure, the organisation of simple shipments, logistics quality and competence, timeliness, and the quality of tracking and tracing shipments.

Similarly, reports by the Kuwaiti logistics company “Agility” demonstrate that the four higher-class markets are still China, India, the UAE, and Malaysia—the UAE ranks third among the best logistics centres. Saudi Arabia fell one position in 2018 and now ranks 6th, possibly due to the worsening of its economic outlook and fluctuations in financial stability. Out of 50 countries, Qatar ranks 11th, Oman ranks 13th, and Iran ranks 18th, whereas Bahrain is 22nd and Kuwait is 29th.

The Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Latvia stresses the role of the company “DP World” as a strategically advantageous partner in the development of interconnections between Europe and Asia. DP World is an international Dubai-based port operator founded in 2005. The company currently operates in 40 countries and on 6 continents, running a total of 78 sea and land enterprises.20

Launching a land terminal operated by this company would serve the interests of Latvia’s transport and logistics sector, while also contributing to Latvia’s opportunities to take part in the Belt and Road Initiative. Latvia’s capacity to accommodate international players on its territory would play an important role in Latvia’s incorporation into the project, positively influencing the flow of goods and serving as an important asset for the logistics industry in general. Currently, there is a relatively inactive response from UAE partners. The UAE ambassador in Latvia has pointed to the role of the upcoming government in establishing relations on this issue.21

Notwithstanding media reports on potential cooperation between the Dubai Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the Freeport of Riga after the former visited Latvia in 2018, the Ministry of Transport points out that because the visiting delegation did not have any representatives of transport and logistics companies, there has been no concrete development of cooperation.

A lot of work has been dedicated to the development of the Iran North-South corridor. The development of interconnections with India within that corridor fits well with Latvian interests in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. Although Iran is lagging behind on developing interconnections with Azerbaijan, cooperation is currently frozen as a result of the renewed US sanctions against Iran. Therefore, as a result of the geopolitical situation, the participation of the state joint-stock company “Latvijas Dzelzceļš” in the international Rail Expo 2019 in Iran remains unclear.22

From the perspective of the Latvian aviation sector, the potential for cooperation is being examined on various economic grounds, including demands for a final destination, the total supply of transportation, and passenger indicators. In the context of the given region, one important factor is that Dubai ranks 3rd in the world by flight demand. Therefore, the priority for Latvia’s air traffic regarding the countries of the Gulf region is clear—it is the UAE. Although airBaltic has already launched direct flights to Abu Dhabi, Riga International Airport is interested in expanding cooperation in two areas—providing year-round direct flights to Abu Dhabi and promoting cooperation with Dubai’s airport. Such an expansion of cooperation makes it possible to enforce competition and offers a choice of quality standards, which is vital in the process of service providing.23

Riga International Airport is the biggest airport in the Baltic States. In 2018, its passenger traffic grew by almost 20% compared to the previous year, and the freight traffic volume increased by nearly 70%.24 Regardless of that, Qatar has announced a plan to launch direct flights to Tallinn starting in spring. Although the Riga airport has clearly demonstrated its openness to cooperation with Qatar Airways, Qatar’s choice can be explained by the close cooperation of airBaltic with Etihad Airways, which serves as a clear example of a political decision trumping a strategic decision.25

Even though the Riga airport is open to offering logistic cooperation to other Gulf countries, it does not see itself involved in any proactive cooperation in the nearest future. In light of the comparatively minuscule passenger flows from other Gulf region countries, the promotion of cooperation with them would not be economically viable for Latvia. Upcoming plans concern ensuring flight regularity with the UAE and cooperation in cargo traffic, primarily with the UAE and secondarily with some extent to Qatar. Looking back on the last year, successful development has been achieved through an increase in the number of flights to Abu Dhabi.

CONCLUSIONS
Most of the conflict crises in the Middle East are interlinked and require comprehensive solutions. Stability can only be restored if the majority of the countries in the region agree on it. However, at a time when Arab allies should seemingly be cooperating with the goal of stabilising the situation in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere, several regional players have chosen to follow their ambitions instead, splitting the regional unity. The recent dominance of Saudi Arabia, along with the blockade of Qatar, divides the regional monarchies into different political positions. Currently, along with strengthening relations with the UAE, Latvia’s position in favour of Saudi Arabia and the UAE is evident. On the one hand, it is a strategically advantageous start—Latvia is trying to establish its position by looking at a wider regional context. And yet, friendly relations with the UAE and potentially Saudi Arabia should not lead us to be manipulated regarding the establishment of relations with other countries in the region, including Iran and Qatar. Formulating the right strategy is currently crucial for Latvia, as one unwise move could have wide-ranging consequences for relations between both sides in the long-term. In other words, during the initial stage of relationship-building, Latvia should establish dignified relations with all countries of the region.

Therefore, in the coming years it would be in Latvia’s interests to practice a dual approach. Latvia needs to work more actively on strengthening its relations with countries that have been left outside the Saudi Arabian bloc.

Latvia being partial to one bloc naturally creates a situation in which only one ideology is being represented by the UAE Embassy in Latvia, whereas the opinions of the other side are completely excluded. In the name of establishing more balanced relations, Latvia’s task could be for example to promote relations with Qatar, which in the best-case scenario could result in opening an Embassy of Qatar in Riga. Such a step would provide a more balanced position for Latvia in the region and would open wider opportunities for cooperation. At the same time, Latvia should provide the maximum possible level of support for the participation of the state joint-stock company “Latvijas Dzelzceļš” in the international Rail Expo 2019 in Iran.

ENDNOTES

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos, 2017, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/aktualitates/ zinas/58797-arlietu-ministra-ikgadejais-zinojums-par-paveikto-un-iecereto-darbibu-valsts- arpolitika-un-eiropas-savienibas-jautajumos-2017-gada
2 Interview with an anonymous official, Riga, 17 October 2018
3 The Central Statistics Bureau, Eksports un imports pa valstīm un teritorijām, http://data1.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/atirdz/atirdz__atirdz__ikgad/ATG020.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=a39c3f49-e95e-43e7-b4f0-dce111b48ba1
4 Foreign Ministry, Latvijas vēstniecība Apvienotajos Arābu Emirātos sāk vīzu izsniegšanu, 01 February 2018, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/aktualitates/zinas/59008-latvijas-vestnieciba-apvienotajos-arabu-emiratos-sak-vizu-izsniegsanu
5 Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos, op. cit.
6 Stephanie Nebehay, Some Saudi-led coalition air strikes in Yemen may amount to war crimes: UN, 28 July 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un-rights/some-saudi-led-coali-tion-air-strikes-in-yemen-may-amount-to-war-crimes-u-n-idUSKCN1LD0KZ
7 Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos, 2017 op. cit.
8 Sintija Broka, Irānas kodolvienošanās krīze un Latvijas uzņēmēju izaicinājumi, 17 April 2018, http://www.liia.lv/en/opinions/iranas-kodolvienosanas-krize-un-latvijas-uznemeju-izaicinaju-mi-699
9 LVportals (from the Ministry of Economy), Latvijas un Apvienoto Arābu Emirātu uzņēmēji diskutē par sadarbības iespējām, 09 May 2018, https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/295452-latvijas-un-apvienoto-arabu-emiratu-uznemeji-diskute-par-sadarbibas-iespejam-2018
10 Arab-Latvian Chanmber of Commerce, http://alcc.lv
11 Diena (LETA), “ES veidos maksājumu sistēmu, lai turpinātu tirdzniecību ar irānu”, 28 September 2018, https://www.diena.lv/raksts/pasaule/eiropa/es-veidos-maksajumu-sistemu-lai-turpinatu-tirdzniecibu-ar-iranu-14205596
12 The World Bank, All countries and economies, GDP (current USD), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&start=2012&year_high_desc=true
13 Anonymous interview, Riga, 17 October 2018
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos, op. cit.
17 Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos, op. cit.
18 Eiropas Komisijas Pārstāvniecība Latvijā, Eiropas valstu solidaritāte enerģētikas jomā: Balti- jas valstu elektrotīklu sinhronizācija ar Eiropas sistēmu nostiprina energoapgādes drošību, https:// ec.europa.eu/latvia/news/eiropas-valstu-solidarit%C4%81te-ener%C4%A3%C4%93tikas- jom%C4%81-baltijas-valstu-elektrot%C4%ABklu-sinhroniz%C4%81cija-ar_lv.
19 Likumi.lv, Ministru Kabineta rīkojums Nr. 129, Par Enerģētikas attīstības pamatnostādnēm 2016.- 2020.gadam, 09 February 2016, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/280236-par-energetikas-attistibas- pamatnostadnem-2016-2020-gadam
20 DP World, https://www.dpworld.com
21 Interview with Andris Maldups and Benita Margēviča, Ministry of Transport, 11 December 2018.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with Laura Audariņa, route development manager, SJSC “Starptautiskā lidosta “Rīga”14 December 2018.
24 Starptautiskā lidosta “Rīga”, 2018.gada 1. ceturksnī RIX pārliecinoši kāpina darbības rādītājus, http://www.riga airport.com/lv/main/zinas/vestkopa/2018/janvaris-marts/2018-gada-1-ce-turksni-rix-parliecinosi-kapina-darbibas-raditajus
25 Interview with Laura Audariņa, op. cit.

Sintija Broka

Everita Nensija Trankale